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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
in the Matter of 
CITY OF NEWBURGH. 
Respondent, 
-and-
LOCAL 589. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF FIRE FIGHTERS. 
Charging Party. 
WILLIAM M. KAVANAUGH. ESQ.. for Respondent 
CRAIN & RONES. P.C. (JOSEPH P. RONES. ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptionis of the City 
of Newburgh (City) to a hearing officer's decision that it 
discriminated against and coerced Dennis Carpenter, an 
assistant fire chief, because of his testimony at a PERB 
hearing. The charge, filed by Local 589, International 
Association of Fire Fighters (Local 589). alleged that the 
City refused to pay Carpenter for time spent at a PERB 
hearing, while paying Paden. another assistant fire chief, 
when both were unit employees. Carpenter was subpoenaed 
by Local 589 and testified on its behalf, while Paden was 
subpoenaed by the City and testified on its behalf. The 
hearing at which they testified was on the application of 
the City to declare each of them, along with other unit 
employees, managerial or confidential. 
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In reaching her decision, the hearing officer relied 
upon the decision of this Board in Vestal Central School 
District. 4 PERB 1P038 (1971). That decision held that 
the school district engaged in improper discriminatory 
conduct when it paid employees it called as witnesses for 
time spent at a PERB hearing in a strike proceeding but 
refused to pay employees called as witnesses by the 
employee organization. 
Twice since the issuance of our decision in Vestal we 
have dismissed charges of improper discrimination when a 
public employer refused to pay witnesses subpoenaed by an 
employee organization for time spent at a PERB hearing, 
while paying its own witnesses for such time. City of New 
York Environmental Protection Agency. 10 PERB ir3009 (1977) 
and City of White Plains. 15 PERB 1P028 (1982). In doing 
so we noted that Vestal did not apply because the 
witnesses in the two later cases were named charging 
parties in the proceedings. 
We are now presented with the broader issue of 
whether, and under what other circumstances, an employer 
may not be required to pay noncharging. union-subpoenaed 
witnesses, while paying its own subpoenaed witnesses. We 
conclude that, absent a clear showing of intent to 
retaliate against an employee for testifying in support of 
a union position, a public employer does not ordinarily 
engage in improper discriminatory conduct when it pays 
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employees whom it calls as witnesses for time spent at a 
PERB hearing but refuses to pay employees who are called 
as witnesses by the union. In this, we are persuaded by. 
and adopt the reasoning of. the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) and the Public Employment Relations 
Commission of the State of Washington. 
Two weeks after this Board decided Vestal, the NLRB 
held that an employer did not commit an unfair labor 
practice by failing to pay wages to witnesses subpoenaed by 
a union to appear at an NLRB hearing even though it paid 
regular wages to other employees whom it subpoenaed to 
appear at the same hearing. Electronic Research Co.. 190 
NLRB 778. 77 LRRM 1324 (1971). Six years later the NLRB 
affirmed that position in General Electric Co.. 230 NLRB 
683, 95 LRRM 1372 (1977). saying (at 1373-74): 
[N]o party stands as the guarantor for equal 
payment to all witnesses summoned by all 
parties to the proceeding. A fortiori, an 
employer . . . is not as a general proposition 
obligated to pay opposition witnesses anything 
in connection with witness fees. Consequently, 
we conclude that an employer is not 
discriminating with respect to the employment 
relationship by not paying an employee called 
as a witness against it the difference between 
what such witness would have earned had he 
worked and what the party calling him as a 
witness is willing to pay. . . . [W]e find 
that there is nothing unlawful in an employer 
using the wages of witnesses as the measure of 
his compensating them for witness fees while 
not also paying employees called by other 
parties the difference between witness fees 
they receive from such parties and what they 
would have been paid as wages for the time they 
testified . . . . 
"•." 85 
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Most recently, in Consolidated Aluminum Corp.. 256 NLRB 
345. 107 LRRM 1246 (1981), it restated the same position. 
The Public Employment Relations Commission of the 
State of Washington has held that ordinarily, in 
litigation before it, each party is responsible for 
compensating its own witnesses. It indicated, however, 
that an employer could not refuse to compensate an 
employee for time spent while testifying for a union when 
the evidence clearly showed that the employer's reason for 
denying such compensation was to retaliate against him for 
his testimony. It found such a clear showing in that 
case. Shelton Education Association. 1 NPER 49-10004 
(1979). 
We are persuaded by the analysis of the NLRB and the 
Washington Public Employment Relations Commission. We too 
do not accept the proposition that disparate treatment of 
employee witnesses is in itself necessarily to be 
condemned as unlawful discrimination. 
Here, no intent to discriminate was alleged or 
shown. The employer's payment of its witness was for time 
he spent in supporting the employer's case, legitimately 
brought under the law. We find no basis in the statute 
requiring the employer to subsidize the opposition's 
case. Accordingly, we determine that the City did not 
engage in improper discriminatory conduct when it paid its 
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own witness for time spent at a PERB hearing but refused 
to pay the witness of the employee organization for such 
time. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE REVERSE the decision of the hearing 
officer, and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: November 1. 1983 
Albany, New York 
S&IU fc%A+a— 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randles\ Member 
DISSENTING OPINION 
OF BOARD CHAIRMAN HAROLD R. NEWMAN 
This Board correctly determined in Vestal that a public 
employer violates the Taylor Law when it pays its own 
witnesses for time spent at a PERB hearing but refuses to 
pay the witnesses of an employee organization.— Such 
discrimination by a public employer must, inevitably, 
discourage public employees from participating in PERB 
hearings as witnesses who testify against the interests of 
their employer. As such, it interferes with their protected 
rights. 
The City argues that the hearing officer should have 
found no violation because it distinguished between its 
witnesses and the witnesses of the employee organization on 
the basis of the good faith belief that such a distinction 
was legitimate and therefore there was no deliberate 
violation of the statute for the purpose of interfering with 
protected rights. I would reject this argument. The 
statutory requirement that the act of the public employer be 
deliberate means only that the action taken was intended. 
In contradistinction, a nondeliberate act is one that is 
i^The exceptions to this doctrine articulated in City of 
New York Environmental Protection Agency. 10 PERB V3009 (1977) 
and City of White Plains. 15 PERB ir3028 (1982). are also 
correct, but they are not relevant to the issue before us. 
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rash or inadvertent. A finding of improper motivation may 
be inferred even in the absence of direct evidence where, by 
its very nature, the conduct tends to discourage the 
2/ 
exercise of protected rights.— This was the theory of 
the Board in finding a violation in Vestal. 
The City's second basis for its exceptions is that the 
hearing officer excluded testimony regarding a past practice 
in which it paid policemen for time spent testifying on its 
behalf but not for time spent testifying in proceedings in 
which they had an interest. Since the instant case concerns 
a different negotiating unit, the exclusion of that 
testimony was not in error as it was not relevant to the 
basis of the hearing officer's decision. 
I would affirm the decision of the hearing officer. 
DATED: November 1. 1983 
Albany. New York 
/ Harold R. Newman. 
^ ^ • A * ^ 
Chairman 
i / s t a t e of New York. 10 PERB 1f3108 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
#2B-ll/l/83 
OLD BROOKVILLE POLICEMEN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION. INC., 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6616 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF OLD BROOKVILLE, 
Charging Party. 
LERNER & GORDON, ESQS. (LAWRENCE M. GORDON. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
CULLEN & DYKMAN. ESQS. (THOMAS M. LAMBERTI. ESQ. 
and BEVERLY I. MORAN, ESQ.. of Counsel), for 
Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed by the Incorporated 
Village of Old Brookville (Village). It complains that the 
Old Brookville Policemen's Benevolent Association, Inc. 
(PBA) violated §209-a.2(b) of the Taylor Law in that it 
refused to negotiate sixteen proposals made by the 
Village. In its answer to the charge. PBA acknowledges its 
refusal to negotiate the sixteen proposals, but it asserts 
no legal obligation to negotiate those proposals because 
they involve nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. The 
hearing officer determined that ten of the proposals 
involved mandatory subjects of negotiation and six did 
not. The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of both 
Board - U-6616 
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parties. PBA has filed exceptions to nine of the ten 
determinations that the proposals are mandatory subjects of 
negotiation, and the Village has filed exceptions to all 
six of the hearing officer's determinations that these 
proposals are nonmandatory. 
PBA's Exceptions 
Proposal No. 6 
During probationary period employee shall 
receive $20 a week less than hiring rate. 
The hearing officer determined that the proposal is for 
a wage rate for police officers who are in a probationary 
status and that wage rate proposals are mandatory subjects of 
negotiation. PBA argues that a wage rate for probationary 
employees is not a mandatory subject of negotiation because 
no police officer in the Village's employ is on probationary 
status. It also contends that probationary employees would 
not be in the PBA negotiating unit and therefore would not be 
covered by the parties' agreement. The Village responds that 
the unit consists of all police officers and that 
probationary police officers are merely new hires who, 
pursuant to the Nassau County Civil Service regulations, may 
be placed on probation for up to one year. 
We determine that the positions that would be held by 
police officers who might be hired during the term of the 
agreement and put in probationary status would be in the 
negotiating unit. A proposal regarding the terms and 
conditions of employment of persons who are to be hired to 
... ®t% 
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fill unit positions is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation.— We affirm the decision of the hearing 
officer regarding Proposal No. 6. 
Proposals No. 8, 10. 12 and 14 deal with new hires and 
can be considered together. They provide: 
Proposal No. 8 
Eliminate sixth year longevity step for new 
hires. 
Proposal No. 10 
Freeze present holiday compensation and 
eliminate for new hires. 
Proposal No. 12 
$1,000 supplemental pay for new hires. 
Proposal No. 14 
Provide twelve sick days for new hires. 
Each of these proposals deals with the terms and 
conditions of employment of persons whom the Village may hire 
during the term of the agreement to serve in positions that 
are now in the negotiating unit. For the reasons stated in 
our discussion of Proposal No. 6, we affirm the decision of 
the hearing officer that such proposals constitute mandatory 
subjects of negotiation. 
Proposal No. 21 also deals with the terms and conditions 
of employment of persons who may be hired during the period 
I/City of Peekskill. 12 PERB 1[3100 (1979); City of 
Newburqh. 16 PERB 1f3030 (1983). 
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covered by the agreement. It states: 
Provide twenty-five year retirement plan for 
new hires. 
In addition to the argument relating to new hires which we 
have already rejected. PBA contends that a municipality may 
not establish one retirement plan fox some of its employees 
and another for other employees. City Building Employees 
Association v. Levitt, 67 AD2d 806 (4th Dept.. 1979). aff'd 
on other grounds 49 NY2d 1033 (1980), contains language which 
provides some support for this position. However, the 
decision in the later case of Village of Fairport v. Newman. 
90 AD2d 293 (Fourth Dept.. 1982). 15 PERB 1[7033. app. dsmd. 
58 NY2d 1112 (1983). 16 PERB T7013, is more directly in point 
and is to the contrary. Dealing with retirement benefits, it 
says that the parties are "free to negotiate . . . less 
advantageous terms for future employees . . . ." We 
therefore affirm the hearing officer's determination that 
Proposal No. 21 is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
Proposal No. 11 
Eliminate additional salary for detectives but 
grandfather existing salary. 
This too is a proposal affecting the terms and 
conditions of employment of persons who may be hired by the 
Village during the period covered by the agreement to fill a 
negotiating unit position. We affirm the hearing officer's 
determination that it is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
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Proposal No. 38 
Careless or negligent reports or documents to 
be corrected on officers' time without 
compensation. 
PBA argues that the demand is not mandatory because it 
would impose additional working time upon police officers 
which might compel them to work beyond the time permitted by 
§971 of the Unconsolidated Laws. Rejecting this argument, 
the hearing officer determined that the demand is mandatory 
because it merely deals with compensation. We affirm the 
decision of the hearing officer. There is no more reason to 
conclude that unpaid time during which carelessly prepared 
reports would be corrected would exceed that permitted by 
law than there is to conclude that the presumably paid time 
during which such reports are now corrected exceeds that 
permitted by law. 
Proposal No. 49 
Contract to be self-renewing for one year 
periods unless either party gives the other 
sixty days notice of termination. 
The proposal merely sets forth a formula for 
determining the duration of the agreement. The hearing 
officer correctly ruled that such a proposal is a mandatory 
2/ 
subject of negotiation.— 
2/see Lynbrook PBA. 10 PERB 1P067 (1977). confirmed 
Village of Lvnbrook v. PERB. 48 NY2d 398, 12 PERB T7021 
(1979) . 
^ 
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The Village's Exceptions 
Proposal No. 20 
Eliminate health insurance payments for 
employees who retire after June 1, 1982. 
The Village presented its proposals to PBA on December 7, 
1982* By that time some police officers may have already 
retired after June 1, 1982. Relying upon City of Troy, 10 PERB 
1f30l5 (1977), the hearing officer ruled that the proposal is 
not a mandatory subject of negotiation to the extent that it 
dealt with employees who had already retired. He further found 
that the demand was a unitary one and therefore nonmandatory in 
its entirety.— 
The Village argues that the hearing officer's reliance on 
City of Troy is misplaced in that Troy declared nonmandatory 
the negotiation of benefits of persons who were not employed 
during the period covered by the agreement, while its proposal 
would only cover persons who were employed by the Village on 
and after June 1, 1982, the day on which the parties' agreement 
would take effect. The distinction drawn by the Village is 
correct. The parties' prior agreement expired on May 30, 1982, 
and a successor agreement may apply retroactively to persons 
who were employed by the Village between the expiration of the 
prior agreement and the execution of its successor. 
Accordingly, the proposal is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
3/see Town of Haverstraw. 11 PERB 1f3109 (1978). 
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Proposal No. 22 
Employees to pay any increase in retirement 
costs over 1982. 
The hearing officer determined that the proposal was 
nonmandatory because "the Village has cited no statutory 
provision permitting an assumption of such expense by 
employees." The Village argues that the proposal should have 
been found mandatory because the cost of retirement benefits 
is a term and condition of employment and there is no 
statutory provision prohibiting the assumption of such 
costs. Citing Town of Huntington v. Associated Teachers. 30 
NY2d 122. 5 PERB T7507 (1972), it argues that, in the absence 
of an explicit prohibition, all terms and conditions of 
employment are mandatory subjects of negotiation. 
We find no statutory, decisional or administrative 
prohibition of the assumption of part of the costs of 
retirement benefits by public employees. Accordingly, we 
determine that Proposal No. 22 is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. 
Proposal No. 44 (as modified) 
An employee who carries an off-duty gun 
outside the territorial area of his employment 
shall be deemed not working in the scope of 
his employment and the employer shall not be 
responsible for his acts. 
The hearing officer determined that the proposal is 
not a mandatory subject of negotiation because it 
"encompasses matters beyond the employment relationship 
. . . ." The Village argues that the proposal is mandatory 
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because it defines the employment relationship. 
We affirm the hearing officer's decision. The Village 
may determine unilaterally whether to impose employment 
obligations upon police officers outside its territorial 
area. Its decision to do so is not a mandatory subject of 
. ._. 4/ 
negotiation.— 
Proposals No. 46 and 47 can be considered 
simultaneously. They provide: 
Proposal No. 46 
Employee who refuses to accept medical 
treatment and hospital care including tests 
shall be deemed to have resigned effective 30 
days after ordered to do so. 
Proposal No. 47 
Employee who is not granted accidental 
disability retirement, who is able to perform 
light duty in the opinion of the Village 
appointed medical doctor and refuses to do 
so. shall be deemed to have resigned 
effective 30 days after ordered to do so. 
The hearing officer determined that the subject matter 
of the proposals is covered by General Municipal Law 
§207-c. Subdivision 1 of that section provides that an 
injured or sick policeman who refuses to accept medical 
treatment shall be deemed to have waived his right to be 
reimbursed for expenses for medical treatment and hospital 
care and for salary and wages payable after such refusal. 
i/citv of Rochester. 12 PERB 1f30l0 (1979). 
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Subdivision 3 provides that a police officer who is able 
but refuses to perform light duty work shall not receive 
salary or wages, but shall continue to be reimbursed for 
medical expenses. The benefits provided by GML §207-c 
5 / 
cannot be withheld except by the terms of that law.— In 
City of Binqhamton, 9 PERB ir3026 (1976), confirmed 
Binqhamton v. Helsby. 9 PERB 1f70l9 (Sup. Ct.. Alb. Co., 
1976), we held that a union cannot be required to negotiate 
the waiver of such employee rights. It follows that the 
two proposals are nonmandatory. 
Proposal No. 48 
Employee on medical leave for more than one 
year who is not able to return to duty as 
determined by the Village appointed medical 
doctor shall be deemed to have resigned 
effective 30 days after one year medical leave. 
This proposal is in direct controvention of GML §207-c 
which provides that a disabled employee continues to receive 
benefits until 1) he reaches the mandatory retirement age, 
2) he is granted an accidental disability retirement 
allowance, or 3) he violates any of the conditions imposed 
by the statute. This proposal would permit the Village to 
impose retirement upon a covered employee merely by reason 
of the lapse of time after the disability commences. It is 
therefore not a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
5/connors v. Bowles. 63 AD2d 956 (2d Dept., 1978), 
mot. lv. app. den. 45 NY2d 832 (1978). 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER PBA to negotiate in good 
faith the proposals found to be 
mandatory subjects of negotiation and 
that the charge herein be. and it 
hereby is, dismissed in all other 
respects. 
DATED: November 1. 1983 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of //2C-11/1/83 
CITY OF BATAVIA. 
Respondent, 
Case No. U-6154 
-and-
BATAVIA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
HARTER. SECREST & EMERY. ESQS. (JACK D. EISENBERG, 
ESQ.. SUE A. JACOBSEN, ESQ. AND BARRY R. WHITMAN, 
ESQ.. of Counsel), for Respondent 
SARGENT & REPKA. P.C. (NICHOLAS J. SARGENT. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City 
of Batavia (City) to a hearing officer's decision that it 
unilaterally changed the medical plan which it had provided 
to its police officers, in violation of the duty to bargain 
in good faith. The charge had been brought by the Batavia 
Police Benevolent Association (PBA) which represents the 
City's police officers. 
Prior to the change which is the subject of the 
improper practice charge, the City provided a medical plan 
consisting of Blue Shield coverage of physicians' charges. 
Blue Cross hospitalization coverage, major medical insurance 
and coverage of drug costs. The collective bargaining 
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agreement between the City and the PBA which expired on 
December 31, 1981, referred to the Blue Shield Plan (known 
as the "50-51 Western New York Health Plan"), the major 
medical and the drug coverage, but not to the Blue Cross 
hospitalization coverage. It provided: 
Article XII 
INSURANCE 
1. The 50-51 Western New York Health Plan 
with major medical and $1 company drug 
rider will be provided by the city. This 
will include all personnel who retire 
after January 1. 1974. 
Prior to February 1981. the drug coverage was provided by 
Blue Cross. In that month the City took over the program a 
a self-insurer without prior negotiation with PBA, and 
without objections from it. 
The parties commenced negotiations for a successor 
collective bargaining agreement in July 1981. From the 
outset, the City sought to negotiate a clause that would 
permit equivalent benefits through an alternate carrier or 
self-insurance. That dispute remained unresolved through 
mediation, interest arbitration— and further negotiation. 
On May 21. 1982. the City notified the PBA that it would 
proceed to implement a self-funded program. Despite the 
continuous objections of the PBA, the City implemented 
I/The health insurance dispute was presented to the 
interest arbitration panel, but its award, issued on May 3. 
1982. did not deal with this dispute. 
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its program on June 14. 1982. and contracted with Healthcare 
Administrative Services of New York, Inc. (HASNY) to 
administer the plan commencing July 1, 1982. On July 2. 
1982, it cancelled the Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plan. 
The hearing officer found no evidence that the change 
from the Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan to self-insurance 
resulted in any substantive changes in benefits or 
administrative procedures. He further found, however, that a 
self-funded plan is fundamentally different from one provided 
by a carrier. By reason of these fundamental differences, he 
concluded that the change of programs constituted a change in 
terms and conditions of employment in violation of CSL 
§209-a.l(d). 
In finding a violation, the hearing officer relied on a 
decision of a hearing officer in City School District of the 
City of Corning. 16 PERB ir4533 (1983), aff'd 16 PERB ir3056 
(1983). which also found that a self-funded plan and one 
provided by an insurance carrier are fundamentally 
different. We based the Corning decision on an alternate 
ground, namely, that the unilaterally imposed plan provided 
benefits that were substantively less favorable for the 
2/ 
employees than the previous plan.— 
-^/Some of these involved specified benefits, others 
flowed from differences in the administrative practices of 
the insurance carrier and self-insurance benefit plan 
administrator. 
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As the record in the instant proceeding reveals no 
substantive differences in the benefits available under the 
two plans or in the procedures by which they are 
administered, we must consider whether there are such 
fundamental differences between the kind of protection 
provided by an insurance carrier and by self-insurance as to 
constitute a material change in the terms and conditions of 
employment of the police officers. Our review of the 
Insurance Law. of the rules of the New York State Insurance 
Department and of the record herein persuades us that there 
are. 
Pursuant to the Insurance Law, insurance carriers are 
regulated by the New York State Insurance Department. 
Employers that provide self-insurance coverage for their 
employees and companies that administer such self-insurance 
programs on behalf of employers are not covered by comparable 
regulations, because neither is doing an insurance 
3/ business.— Thus, an employee who enjoys carrier-provided 
health insurance benefits has an administrative remedy before 
the Insurance Department if the carrier engages in unfair 
^Insurance Law §41; Colaizzi v. Pa. R. R. Co.. 208 NY 
275 (1913); Mutual Life Ins. Cr. v. NYS Tax Comm., 32 NY2d 
348 (1973); Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. World Wide 
Rent-A-Car. 28 AD2d 286 (1st Dept.. 1967). 
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claims settlement practices while one whose benefits derive 
4/ from self-insurance does not.— Similarly, only an employee 
who enjoys carrier-provided health insurance benefits is 
protected by state standards relating to the solvency of 
5/ 
insurance carriers.— The fact that the State Legislature 
deems these protections to be important enough to impose them 
upon all insurance carriers is an indication of their 
substantiality, thus making their elimination a change in the 
basic assurance accorded employees in the previously enjoyed 
health and welfare aspects of the terms and conditions of 
6/ their employment.— 
Accordingly, we affirm the hearing officer's 
determination that the unilateral change from carrier-provided 
insurance to employer-provided self-insurance was a violation 
of §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law. 
1/lnsurance Law §40-d; 11 NYCRR §216 et. seq. 
^/insurance Law §§26. 27, 28. 98. 256 and Article 16. 
Ji/while the employment relations agency of at least 
one other state held that the change from carrier-provided 
insurance to self-insurance does not, by itself, impact upon 
terms and conditions of employment and, therefore, is not a 
mandatory subject of negotiation (Menomonie Education Assn.. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, Case No. 23812, 
January 2, 1981), the implications of the New York State 
Insurance Law compels a contrary conclusion in this state. 
*• 8601 
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Having so determined, we must now consider the City's 
exceptions to the hearing officer's rejection of its other 
defenses. These were that PBA waived its right to negotiate 
the change; that there were compelling reasons to make the 
change and that the City was willing to negotiate after 
making it; that the Blue Shield "50-51" plan had been 
discontinued by Blue Cross/Blue Shield as of January 1. 1983. 
and. therefore, there can be no make-whole remedy. 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the hearing 
officer's rejection of these defenses for the reasons set 
forth in his decision. Accordingly, the exceptions are 
dismissed.— 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER the City of Batavia to: 
1. Immediately reinstate the prior 
insurance plan or provide equivalent 
insurance coverage by the same or 
another insurance company regulated by 
the New York State Insurance Department; 
2. Make unit employees whole for any loss 
or diminution of benefits caused by the 
implementation of the City's self-
insurance plan; 
2/The City moved to dismiss the PBA's response to its 
exceptions for late filing. We need not decide this motion 
inasmuch as the exceptions present nothing for consideration 
which was not considered and rejected by the hearing officer. 
v 'H\*\ 
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3. Negotiate in good faith with the PBA; 
4. Sign and post notices in the form 
attached at all locations normally used 
for communications to unit employees. 
DATED: November 1. 1983 
Albany. New York 
j/kr>» 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Su. JcyUouL. 
Ida Klaus, Member 
•nam 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the non-supervisory unit represented by the 
Batavia Police Benevolent Association (PBA) that the City of Batavia will: 
1. Immediately reinstate the prior insurance plan or provide 
equivalent insurance coverage by the same or another 
insurance company regulated by the New York State Insurance 
Department; 
2. Make unit employees whole for any loss or diminution of 
benefits caused by the implementation of the City's self-
insurance plan; 
3. Negotiate in good faith with the PBA. 
City of Batavia 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
#2D-ll/l/83 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA and SHERIFF OF 
ONEIDA COUNTY, 
Joint Employer. 
-and-
ONEIDA COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S CASE NO. C-2611 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner, 
-and-
LOCAL 182, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS. 
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA. 
Intervenor. 
DAVID R. TOWNSEND, JR., for Petitioner 
ROCCO A. DePERNO. ESQ. (FREDERICK W. MURAD, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Oneida 
County Deputy Sheriff's Benevolent Association (OCDSBA) 
to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Board - C-2611 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing its 
petition on the ground that it had been filed without 
proper authorization. The petition was to represent 
deputy sheriffs jointly employed by the County of Oneida 
and the Sheriff of Oneida County and currently 
represented by Local 182. International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters. Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America (Local 182). 
The petition was filed by David R. Townsend, Jr. At 
the pre-hearing conference. Local 182 asserted that the 
petition was invalid. It presented affidavits from 
eleven of the fourteen OCDSBA officers and directors at 
the time of the filing of the petition which stated that 
Townsend held no OCDSBA office at that time and was not 
authorized to file the petition. While confirming his 
formal lack of authorization. Townsend asserted that the 
membership signatures constituting the showing of 
interest were a sufficient indication of his authority. 
He also stated that he was elected president of OCDSBA 
four weeks after he filed the petition. 
After the conference, the trial examiner prepared a 
statement of the facts that had been agreed upon and she 
sent it to the parties. Her letter noted that the 
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officers and directors of OCDSBA had not authorized the 
petition and that OCDSBA's constitution and bylaws did 
not grant individual members any right to act on its 
behalf. She ended her letter by stating that no 
hearing would be held unless Townsend submitted 
additional facts or legal arguments with respect to his 
authority to file the petition. 
Townsend responded by contesting the validity of 
some of the affidavits on the ground that the persons 
executing them were not officers or directors at the 
time of their execution. The Director found this 
response irrelevant because Townsend had conceded that 
he had not been authorized to file the petition by 
whomever constituted OCDSBA's officers and directors. 
Among the affidavits to which Townsend objected was one 
by Vennero, OCDSBA's former president. Townsend's 
letter stated that Vennero had resigned his office in 
November 1982. Other material presented at the 
conference indicates that Vennero was still president 
in April 1983. 
The exceptions filed by Townsend as president of 
OCSDBA make the following allegations of fact: 
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1 
A. The bylaws authorize the president to act 
on behalf of OCDSBA between general 
meetings. 
B. The former president resigned his office 
during November 1982. 
C. The then vice-president of OCDSBA became 
acting president in accordance with the 
bylaws of the organization. 
D. The acting president then authorized 
Townsend to file the petition herein. 
On the basis of these allegations, Townsend argues that 
the Director erred in determining that he was not 
authorized to file the petition. 
We find that the materials submitted to the Director 
did not include allegations sufficient to raise a 
question of fact regarding Local 182's objections to the 
validity of the petition. On the alleged facts before 
him, the Director properly dismissed the petition without 
1/ 
requiring a hearing.— 
I/see Spencerport CSD. 16 PERB ir3074 (1983). in which 
we held that where a party had the opportunity to make 
allegations of fact before the dismissal of its charge but 
did not do so, we will not consider whether allegations of 
fact made thereafter would have justified a hearing. 
%f ^iji 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the petition herein be. 
and it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: November 1, 1983 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CSEA. NASSAU LOCAL 830. 
Respondent, 
-and-
LOCAL 808, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS. 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF NORTH HEMPSTEAD, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6800 
LOCAL 808. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS. 
Charging Party. 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH. ESQS. (WILLIAM M. 
WALLENS. ESQ., of Counsel), for CSEA. Nassau 
Local 830 
ROBERT DOLAN. ESQ., for Town of North Hempstead 
O'DWYER & BERNSTEIN. ESQS. (GARY SILVERMAN. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Local 808. International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters 
#2E-ll/l/83 
CASE NO. U-67 99 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Board - U-6799/U-6800 -2 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Local 808, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Local 808) to a 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing its charge (U-6799) 
against CSEA, Nassau Local 830 (Local 830) and its charge 
(U-6800) against the Town of North Hempstead (Town). The 
charges allege that Local 830 and the To.wn were improperly 
motivated when they entered into a collective bargaining 
agreement on April 27. 1983, and that this improper 
motivation constituted an improper practice. Local 808 
contends that the timing of the agreement was designed to 
deprive the employees of the Town of the right to vote in a 
representation election. 
Local 830 was the representative of the employees 
covered by the agreement when it was signed. The Director 
ruled that a public employer and an employee organization do 
not violate the Taylor Law by hastening to conclude a 
collective bargaining agreement in order to avoid the 
initiation of a representation proceeding by another 
employee organization. He therefore dismissed the charges 
on the ground that they do not allege improper conduct. In 
its exceptions. Local 808 complains that the Director failed 
to consider various allegations it made in support of its 
charges. 
In order to meet the Director's objections to its 
charges. Local 808 made three supplementary allegations, and 
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amended its charge against the Town by specifically including 
a reference to §209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) of the Taylor Law. 
The first of the supplementary allegations elaborated upon 
the charges by stating that the sole purpose of the agreement 
of April 27, 1983. was to frustrate Local 808's intention to 
file a representation petition.— The other two 
supplementary allegations were designed to show that the Town 
bore animus toward Local 808 and preferred to deal with Local 
830. One is that supervisory employees of the Town spread 
false and misleading stories about Local 808 and threatened 
reprisals against the employees if Local 808 were certified. 
The other is that supervisory employees of the Town assisted 
Local 830 in the collection of ratification vote ballots. 
We affirm the Director's determination that the latter 
two allegations were not encompassed by the charges before 
2/ him.— We also affirm his determination that it is not 
1/Pursuant to PERB Rule 201.3(e), a timely petition 
could have been filed by Local 808 on or after May 1, 1983, 
if Local 830 and the Town had not entered into a collective 
bargaining agreement before that date. 
2/The Director properly noted that these two 
allegations might constitute the basis of separate charges. 
In this connection, we observe that Local 808 amended its 
charge against the Town with respect to a statutory 
reference, but not to allege any improper conduct other than 
that Local 830 and the Town entered into an agreement on 
April 27, 1983. 
Board - U-6799/U-6800 
improper for an employee organization and a public 
employer to accelerate their negotiations for the 
purpose of concluding an agreement before the 
commencement of the period when an outside employee 
organization could properly file a petition under our 
Rules of Procedure. These rules afford an employee 
organization two distinct opportunities to challenge a 
recognized or certified employee organization. The 
primary opportunity, afforded by Rule 201.3(d). is to 
file a petition during the eighth month before the 
expiration of an existing agreement. The alternative 
opportunity, afforded by Rule 201.3(e). is to file a 
petition four months after the expiration of an 
agreement if no new agreement has been reached. Local 
808 did not file a petition during the eighth month 
before the expiration of the agreement between Local 830 
and the Town and it has no Taylor Law right to file 
again until the eighth month before the expiration of 
the next agreement. Accordingly. Local 830 and the Town 
violated no Taylor Law right of Local 808 by entering 
into an agreement which deprived Local 808 of an 
opportunity to petition after the expiration of their 
past agreement. 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charges herein be, 
and they hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: November 1, 1983 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #2F-ll/i/83 
COUNTY OF NASSAU. 
Respondent, CASE NO. U-5571 
-and-
PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF 
THE POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE COUNTY OF 
NASSAU. INC.. 
Charging Party. 
EDWARD G. McCABE. ESQ. (PETER A. BEE. ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
AXELROD. CORNACHIO & FAMIGHETTI, ESQS. (MICHAEL C. 
AXELROD. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the motion of the County of 
Nassau to modify our decision and order issued on December 
30, 1982. The motion recites events which it is asserted 
warrant modification of the order. All of these events 
occurred prior to the date when the parties entered into the 
stipulation of facts dated April 15, 1982, upon which the 
hearing officer's decision was based. Nassau County argues 
that one of the events upon which it relies is its entry 
into a formal agreement with the Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Association of the Police Department of the County of 
Nassau. Inc. after the stipulation was executed. The 
agreement, however, was merely the formalization of a 
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memorandum of agreement that had been entered into before 
the stipulation was executed. 
The County was aware of the events recited in the 
motion when they occurred. These events cannot, therefore, 
be the basis for a motion at this time to modify our 
decision and order. Binqhamton Fire Fighters. Local 729. 
IAFF. AFL-CIO, 9 PERB ir3078 (1976). 
Accordingly, we order that the motion be, and it hereby 
is, denied. 
DATED: November 1. 198 3 
Albany, New York 
-7fk*e^/?jC. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
^ k /Cl&<»^— 
Ida Klaus, Member 
vid C. Randies. Membc 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ELLENVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer. 
-and-
ELLENVILLE ADMINISTRATORS AND 
SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner 
//2G-11/1/83 
BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. C-2510 
On September 30. 1982. the Ellenville Administrators 
and Supervisors Association (petitioner) filed a timely 
petition for certification as the exclusive negotiating 
representative of certain administrative employees of the 
Ellenville Central School District. 
A secret ballot election was held on October 18, 1983. 
pursuant to an Order issued by this Board on July 27. 
1983.— in which we found the appropriate negotiating 
1/ We ordered that a secret ballot election be held among 
eligible employees in the unit determined to be 
appropriate. Also in that decision we affirmed the 
Director's finding that the elementary school 
principal and secondary school principal positions 
were appropriately in the Administrators unit even 
though the incumbents were designated managerial or 
confidential. 
v 8617 
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unit to be as follows: 
Included: Secondary Principal (10-12), 
Secondary Principal (7-9), Assistant 
Principal (10-12), Elementary 
Principal, Assistant Principal 
(Elementary), Director of Physical 
Education and Athletics (K-12). 
Excluded: All other employees; 
The results of the election indicate that a majority of 
eligible voters in the unit do not desire to be represented 
• • 2/ by the petitioner.— 
THEREFORE. IT IS ORDERED that the petition be, and it 
hereby is, DISMISSED. 
Dated: Albany, New York, 
November 1. 1983 
%Vy*pg-*<, 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
<^ C^ . £Xt*<s4^ 
Ida Klaus. Member 
David C. Randies.^Member/ 
27 Of the three ballots cast, one was for and two against 
representation by the petitioner. There were no 
challenged ballots. 
8R18 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#3A-ll/l/83 In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF SKANEATELES, 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NO. C-2522 
SKANEATELES POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner, 
-and-
ONONDAGA LOCAL 834 OF THE CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. 
AFL-CIO. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Skaneateles Police 
Benevolent Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above named employer, in the 
unit described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
..-,< >s>'<>_&. O ' 
Certification - C-2522 page 2 
Unit: Included: 
Excluded: 
All police officers. 
All other employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Skaneateles Police 
Benevolent Association and enter into a written agreement with 
such employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the unit found appropriate, and 
shall negotiate collectively with such employee organization in 
the determination of, and administration of, grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: November 1, 1983 
Albany, New York 
7vL 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
<s>*^ >^ / > W ^ — 
Ida Klaus, Member 
tW*b£F* 
David'C. Randies, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #3B-ll/i/83 
TOWN OF HAMBURG. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2604 
SOUTHTOWN POLICE CLUB, INC.. 
Petitioner, 
-and-
LOCAL 2753. COUNCIL 82, AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Southtown Police Club, Inc. 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
, settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All classified, competitive civil 
service police officers. 
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Excluded: Chief of Police, captains, 
detective lieutenants, and 
lieutenants. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Southtown Police Club. Inc. 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the unit found appropriate, and shall negotiate 
collectively with such employee organization in the determination 
of, and administration of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: November 1. 1983 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
«^ g£*- Ai^u^^x—-
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Rand 
'"•i \3>'<Jfalh* 
